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The Efficient and Fair Approval of “Multiple-Cost – Single-Benefit” 
Projects under Unilateral Information
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This paper focuses on indivisible multiple-cost–single-benefit projects that must be approved 
by the government. A simple mechanism is proposed that ensures an efficient and fair 
implementation of such projects. The proposed mechanism is appropriate for a unilateral 
information structure: the single beneficiary has complete information on the cost and benefit 
of the project while the government official has no such information and the cost bearers 
have information only on each other's costs. 
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Consider a regulated economy in which the undertaking of a specific 
indivisible project that yields a net benefit to a single player and inflicts costs on the 
other players requires the approval of the government (bureaucrat). The beneficiary 
typically applies to the government official (bureaucrat) in order to obtain a license to 
undertake the project. For example, a company applies to the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) for a license to construct a new plant that will produce 
pollution; a telecommunication company applies to the City Council for permission to 
site communication towers and antennas near or in the city; an employer applies to the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) for a visa to bring in a foreign worker; 
a family applies for a license to extend its house; and a taxi driver applies to the 
Ministry of Transportation for permission to operate a taxi. The problem of the 
government official is two-fold: first, should the project be approved and second, if it 
is, how can it be fairly implemented. The bureaucrat's objective then is to achieve an 
efficient and equitable outcome. This objective is especially challenging in situations 
where the bureaucrat has no information on either the benefit or the cost of the 
project, while such information is available to the single beneficiary of the project and 
partly available to the other players. Specifically, the players who are adversely 
affected by the project are only aware of each other's costs, but have no information 
on the benefit and cost to the single beneficiary. Implementation theory distinguishes 
between two distinct scenarios: complete-information environments and incomplete-
information environments. In both scenarios, the regulator is ignorant about the 
environment. In the complete-information setting, all players know the environment 
while in the incomplete-information setting, players can possess private information 
such that a player may not know the true environment either. In our setting, no 
information is available to the government official while there is information 
asymmetry between the beneficiary of the project and the other players, i.e., the 
information structure is unilateral rather than bilateral. The objective of this paper is 
to propose a new and simple mechanism that induces the beneficiary to apply for and 
undertake the project only if her/his net benefit from the project outweighs the cost it 
imposes on the other players. Furthermore, the proposed mechanism also induces the 
beneficiary to fully compensate each of the adversely affected individuals and 
therefore ensures efficiency and fairness.   2 
 
 
  The project that we focus on can be viewed as a discrete private good that 
involves negative externalities. Accordingly, the main problem is how to ensure the 
efficient and fair production of this good in a regulated environment. There are three 
well-known classes of solution to the problem of externalities; however, given our 
particular setting, only one is applicable. One class of solutions, which is associated 
with Arrow (1970), involves the creation of a competitive market for the externality. 
An example would be a competitive market for pollution permits (see, for example, 
Kwerel, 1977; Lewis and Sappington, 1995; Duggan and Roberts, 2001a, 2002; 
English and Yates, 2007; and Kahana et al., 2008). However, in our case the market is 
not competitive since it involves only one participant – the single beneficiary. A 
second class of solutions, which is associated with Pigou (1920), involves 
intervention by a regulator who imposes a Pigovian tax. The absence of information 
and the discrete nature of the project exclude the imposition of such a tax in our case. 
The third class of solutions, which is associated with Coase (1960) and which is 
indeed relevant to our setting, involves negotiation between the players on appropriate 
compensation.  Coase claims that if transaction costs are zero and property rights are 
well-defined, players should be able to negotiate their way to an efficient outcome. 
But this is an incomplete solution to the problem of externalities since Coase does not 
describe a specific mechanism for negotiation. Varian’s (1994) compensation 
mechanism provides a structure for such negotiation under “bilateral” information in a 
continuous setting. Our mechanism can also be viewed as being complementary to 
Coase’s approach under “unilateral” information in a dichotomous setting. In Varian's 
compensation mechanism, the polluting plant already exists and the main issue is how 
to regulate the level of pollution (production). In our setting, the main issue is whether 
to allow the construction of a polluting plant. In Varian's compensation mechanism, 
those who are harmed are just compensated on the margin for the cost imposed on 
them, whereas under our mechanism they are fully compensated. In a marginal 
context, fairness cannot be attained; in our setting it can. 
   Most of the attempts to find solutions to the problem of externalities can be 
viewed as relating to a problem that arises in the presence of public goods. In the 
particular externality problem under consideration, the public good is an indivisible 
mixed public-private good. The provision is mixed because although the government 
is responsible for approving the project, the beneficiary has to voluntarily and 
privately apply for the approval and she/he (rather than the government) is solely   3 
 
 
responsible for its financing. The project is a public good because its undertaking 
affects (positively or negatively) the utility of all the players. There is a vast literature 
on the analysis of voluntary contribution games with discrete public goods (see, for 
example, Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1984; Gradstein and Nitzan, 1990; Admati and Perry, 
1991; Bagnoli and Lipman, 1989, 1992; and Jackson and Moulin, 1992). The 
proposed voluntary contribution mechanism can implement the first-best outcome 
when individuals have certain knowledge of the threshold level of contributions 
needed for provision. However, in that setting all the players benefit from the project 
and thus the major issue is how to design an appropriate cost-sharing rule. In contrast, 
in our specific class of problems, there is only a single private beneficiary who is 
responsible for funding the project and therefore the challenge is to design a simple 
mechanism that efficiently and equitably implements the project. Note that Clarke 
(1971)’s well-known demand-revealing mechanism can also be applied in cases 
where some players are harmed by the project. However, it fails to achieve efficiency 
since it requires the levying of taxes that must then be wasted. Other mechanisms as 
well suffer from this shortcoming (see for instance Groves, 1973). Our mechanism is 
balanced in equilibrium though not out of equilibrium.  Moore and Repullo (1988) 
and Abreu and Sen (1990) among others demonstrate that in economic environments, 
almost any choice rule can be implemented by multistage games and subgame-perfect 
equilibria. However, as Moore and Repullo pointed out, " … the mechanisms we 
construct …are far from simple….We present such mechanisms to show what is 
possible, not what is realistic." They also show that in certain cases it is possible to 
use somewhat simpler mechanisms. Maniquet (2003) characterizes the family of 
allocation rules that can be implemented in economic environments by a sequential 
Divide-and-Challenge perfect information mechanism. His mechanism is general and 
rather complicated.
1 Furthermore, it does not generalize to cover the 2- player case, a 
notably difficult one for implementation. The mechanism proposed for the specific 
economic environments on which we focus is relatively simple, more realistic and 
covers the 2- player case. 
  The particular setting on which we focus is presented in Section 2. A simple 
two-player version (one beneficiary and one cost-bearer) of the proposed mechanism 
                                                 
1Earlier, Herrero and Srivastava (1992) have also characterized the class of social choice rules 
implementable through finite perfect information mechanisms. Due to complexity, it is very hard to 
compare the conditions in both papers,   4 
 
 
is described in Section 3. The general mechanism that ensures efficient and fair 
approval of indivisible multiple-cost–single-benefit projects  under unilateral 
information is presented in Section 4. The last section contains brief concluding 
remarks.  
 
2. The setting 
One individual, indexed a, applies to the government official for receiving a 
license to undertake an indivisible project. The net benefit (net of the cost related to 
carrying out the project) in monetary terms that Player a receives from the project is 
+ ℜ ∈ a V . But by carrying out this project Player a imposes costs on N  individuals in 
the environment. The cost imposed on individual  N i∈  is  + ℜ ∈ i V  (the neighbors of 
the extended house, the producers and consumers affected by the new plant, local 
workers whose wages decline or, more generally, players whose utility decrease as a 
result of entry of new foreign workers, the existing taxi owners who face more 
competition or consumers suffering from increased pollution). These costs are 
common knowledge among all the individuals including the beneficiary Playera, but 
are unknown to the social planner. The informational structure is unilateral in the 
sense that, whereas the beneficiary knows the costs of the N  individuals opposing the 
approval of Player a’s application, the latter, as well as the government official, do not 
know Player a’s net benefit (benefit and costs).  
An outcome in our setting is represented by a vector ) , , , ( 1 N T T d x K = , 
where  {} 0   , 1 = d  is a dichotomous decision variable;  1 = d  means approval and  0 = d  
means disapproval, and  + ℜ ∈ i T  is the monetary transfer from Player a to Player i. 
The set of outcomes is then: 
{ } { }. , , 1 , 0 : ) , , , ( 1 i i N T d T T d X ∀ ℜ ∈ ∈ = + K  
            Player i’s payoff (utility) function  ℜ → × i i V X U :  is quasi-linear
2, that is: 
i dV T V x U i i i i ∀ − = , ) , ( 
and   
                                                 
2The quasi-linearity assumption is common in the public economics literature, especially in the context 
of voluntary provision of public goods and demand revealing mechanisms, see, for example, Clarke 
(1971), Groves (1976), Bagnoli and Lipman (1989), Jackson and Moulin (1992) and Mutuswami and 








i a a a T dV V x U
1
) , ( 
A  social choice function X V V V f N a → × × × K 1 : , assigns to each 
possible profile of the players’ values an outcome X V f ∈ ) ( . 
A function f is efficient if for no profile V there exists a vector , X x ∈ such 
that, ) ), ( ( ) , ( a a a a V V f U V x U ≥  and  ) ), ( ( ) , ( i i i i V V f U V x U ≥ , i ∀  and  i ∃ such 
that, ) ), ( ( ) , (   i i i i V V f U V x U > or ) ), ( ( ) , ( a a a a V V f U V x U > . It can be easily shown 
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i a V V
1
0 it does not matter if the project is approved or 
not. 
 
We restrict ourselves to a fair social choice function. By fairness it is meant 
that in case that the project is disapproved (i.e.,  0 = d ) no transfers from Player a to 
the other players are made (i.e.,  0 = i T ) whereas, if the project is undertaken each 
player is fully compensated (i.e.,  i i V T = ).  This implies that a function f is fair if it 
satisfies the following requirements:  , ) V ), V ( f ( U , i i i 0 = ∀ and 0 ) ), ( ( ≥ a a V V f U . 
The problem is that the government official has to make a central planner 
decision without knowing the net benefit of Playera and the cost borne by each of the 
other individuals. Therefore, he has to design a mechanism that induces the players to 
reveal their information about the benefit and the costs resulting from the project 
under consideration. Our objective is to present a simple (decentralized) sequential 
mechanism that, instead of inducing the players to reveal to the government their 
benefit and costs, induces the beneficiary Player a to apply for and undertake only 
efficient projects, as well as fully compensate each of the individuals adversely 
affected by the execution of the project. 
   6 
 
 
3. The mechanism for N=1 
Let us consider first the case with one beneficiary denoted a and one cost-
bearing individual denotedb . The sequential mechanism is defined as follows (see 
Figure 1).  
Stage 1: Player a has two options: apply or not for the license to undertake 
the indivisible project. If s/he does not apply, the project is not undertaken and the 
utility of each player is zero. If Player a applies, s/he has to announce the cost 
imposed by the project on Player b ,  b T ,  + ℜ ∈ b T . Proceed to stage 2. 
Stage 2: Playerb  can confirm or not the announcement of Player a. If s/he 
confirms, Player a transfers to Playerb  the declared amount  b T  and s/he has to 
decide whether to carry out the project ( 1 = d ) or not ( 0 = d ). After these two 
decisions of Player a the game ends. Notice that, regardless of Player a’s second 
decision, s/he has to pay Player b the amount  b T . Therefore, the resulting utilities 
when  1 = d  and  0 = d  are equal, respectively, to  ) , ( ) , ( b b b a b a V T T V U U − − =  and 
) , ( ) , ( b b b a T T U U − = .  
If Player b  does not confirm the announcement of Player a, s/he has to make 
an alternative declaration, b T′, regarding the cost s/he bears due to the project, where 
b b T T > ′ . That is, s/he can only claim that Player a’s announced cost is under-
estimated.  Proceed to stage 3. 
Stage 3: Given the alternative higher cost declared by Player b, Player a can 
either regret, i.e., decide not to undertake the project s/he applied for, or pass the 
privilege to decide on the execution of the project to Playerb . In the former case (of 
regret) Player a has to pay Player b an amount  0 > δ  for bothering him. The resulting 
utilities in this situation are ) , ( ) , ( δ δ − = b a U U . In the latter case, the game proceeds to 
stage 4. 
Stage 4: Player b either approves the application of Player a or disapproves it. 
In the former case, Player a can undertake the project without compensating Player 
b . This ensures that Player a undertakes the project. The resulting utilities in this 
situation are  ) , ( ) , ( b a b a V V U U − = . In the latter case that Player b disapproves Player 
a’s application, the project is not undertaken and both players are punished for 
"bothering" the government official. The fines that Player a and Player b pay to the   7 
 
 
government are equal, respectively, to  δ 2  and  b T′ (Notice that Player b’s fine 
depends on her/his earlier declaration in stage 2). The resulting utilities are equal to 
) , 2 ( ) , ( b b a T U U ′ − − = δ . 
Insert Figure 1 here 
 
          The following proposition establishes that the unique outcome of the subgame-
perfect Nash equilibrium is efficient and fair.  
  
Proposition 1: The unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the game satisfies the 
following conditions:  
1.  If 0 < − b a V V , then Player a does not apply for the license.  
2.  If 0 > − b a V V , then Player a applies for the license and carries out the 
project as well as fully compensates Player b. 
3.  If 0 = − b a V V , then Player a is indifferent between not applying and 
between applying, proceeding, and fully compensating. 
 
3.1. The analysis of the mechanism 
How does this sequential mechanism work?  Using  the  solution  concept  of 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, we start by solving for the optimal choice of the 
last mover, Player b , for each possible situation s/he might face, and then work 
backward to determine the optimal choice for the other player, Player a, who makes a 
decision in the earlier stage.  
         Suppose that in stage 1, Player  a applies for a license and announces  b b V T <  
(s/he under-reports Player b’s cost). Then it is optimal for Player b  to challenge 
Player  a by declaring  b T′, such that,  b b b V T T < ′ < . Player a knows then that if s/he 
passes the privilege to decide on the execution of the project to Playerb  her/his utility 
will be  δ 2 − . This is because Player b’s decision will be to disapprove the license 
application and thereby increase her/his utility from  b V −  to  b T′ − . Therefore, Player 
a, in stage 3, will give up the project, in which case, her/his utility increases from 
δ 2 −  to  δ − . The utilities of the players in this case are equal to  ). , ( ) , ( δ δ − = b a U U  
Notice that if, in stage 2, Player b  confirms the cost announcement of Player a,   8 
 
 
instead of challenging her/him, then Player  a will carry out the project in stage 2, in 
which case Player b's utility will be  0 < − b b V T ,which is lower than  . δ  
           Now suppose that in stage 1, Player  a applies for a license and announces 
b b V T ≥ (s/he over-reports Player b’s cost). In this case, it is optimal for Player b  to 
approve Player a’s announcement, already in stage 2, and this induces Player a to 
undertake the project and receive the benefit  b a T V − . The resulting utility of Player  b 
is  b b V T − (if instead of approving Player a’s declaration, Player b  challenges Player 
a by declaring  b T′, such that  b b b V T T ≥ > ′ , then Player a would have passed the 
privilege to decide to Player b, realizing that Player b would approve the license 
application, in which case her/his utility increases from  b T′ −  to  b V − . But  b V −  is still 
lower than Player b’s utility from approving Player a’s announcement already in stage 
2,  b b V T − ). In this case then, the players’ utilities are  ). , ( ) , ( b b b a b a V T T V U U − − =   
           To sum up, taking into account the optimal behavior of Player b in stage 2 and 
4, in stage 1 Playera can choose one of the following three strategies: 
(i) Do not apply for a license to undertake the project. In this case, her/his utility is 
zero, (ii) Apply for a license and under-report Player b’s cost,  b b V T < . In this case, 
Player b  challenges Player a inducing him not to proceed with the project and obtain 
the utility  δ − . (iii) Apply for a license and make a truthful announcement or over-
report,  b b V T ≥ . In this case, Player b  approves the cost announcement of Player a, 
already in stage 2, inducing Player a to undertake the project and compensate him 
according to Player a’s announcement. In this case Player a’s utility is  b a T V − . This 
implies that it is preferable for Playera  to make a truthful report, i.e., declare  b b V T =  
and have a utility of  b a V V − . It is clear that strategy (i) dominates strategy (ii) and 
therefore, Playera never chooses strategy (ii). However, if   0 > − b a V V , then strategy 
(iii) dominates strategy (i) and vice versa, if  0 < − b a V V . We have therefore obtained 
that, if  0 > − b a V V , then it is optimal for Playera to apply for a license, make a 
truthful cost announcement and undertake the project. If, however,  0 < − b a V V , then 
it is optimal for Player a not to apply for a license. The resulting utilities in these two   9 
 
 
possible cases are equal, respectively, to  ) 0 , ( ) , ( b a b a V V U U − =  and 
) 0 , 0 ( ) , ( = b a U U . 
3 
 
4. Extension to the case of N>1 cost-bearing players 
The sequential mechanism is modified as follows (see Figure 2).  
Stage 1: Player a has two options: apply or not for the license to undertake 
the indivisible project. If s/he does not apply, the project is not undertaken and the 
utility of each player is zero. If Player a  applies, s/he has to announce the cost 
imposed by the project on each of the  N players  ), , , ( 1 N T T T K =  where
N T + ℜ ∈ . 
Proceed to stage 2.  
Stage 2: The social planner randomly selects one player, indexed c, among the 
N cost-bearing individuals. Player c can confirm the announcement of Player a or 
not. If s/he confirms, Player a transfers to each player i the declared amount,  i T  and 
s/he has to decide whether to carry out the project ( 1 = d ) or not ( 0 = d ). After these 
two decisions of Player a the game ends. Notice that regardless of Player a’s second 
decision, Player a has to pay each player i the amount  i T . Therefore, the resulting 
utilities when  1 = d  and  0 = d  are, respectively: 
) , , , ( ) , , , ( 1
1
1 1 N N
N i
i
i a N a V T V T T V U U U − − − = ∑
=
=
K K  and 





i N a T T T U U U K K ∑
=
=
− = .  
            If Player cdoes not confirm the announcement of Player a, s/he has to choose 
one player, indexed b, among the N  cost-bearing individuals (it might even be s/he 
herself/himself). Proceed to stage 3. 
Stage 3: Player b can either disagree or agree with Playerc. If s/he disagrees, 
Player  c has to pay the social planner a fineδ , and Playera has to transfer to each 
player i the amount declared in stage 1,  i T  and s/he has to decide whether to carry out 
the project ( 1 = d ) or not ( 0 = d ). After these two decisions of Player a the game 
ends. Notice that, regardless of Player a’s second decision, s/he has to pay each player 
                                                 
3 When  0 = − b a V V , Player a is indifferent between not applying for a license and applying, making a 
truthful cost announcement and undertaking the project. This is because in both cases his utility is zero.   10 
 
 
i the amount  i T . Therefore, the resulting utilities when  1 = d  and  0 = d  are, 
respectively:  ) , , , , , ( ) , , , , , (
1
1 1 1 N N c c
N i
i
i a N c a V T V T V T T V U U U U − − − − − = ∑
=
=
K K K K δ   
and   ) , , , , , ( ) , , , , , (
1
1 1 N c
N i
i




 If  Player  b  agrees with Playerc, s/he has to make an alternative declaration 
b T′, regarding the cost s/he bears due to the project, where  b b T T > ′ . That is, s/he can 
only claim that Player a’s announced cost is under-estimated. Proceed to stage 4. 
Stage 4: Given the alternative higher cost declared by Player b, Player acan 
either regret i.e., decide not to undertake the project, and compensate Player b  and 
Player c  for bothering them, by paying them, respectively, an amount  0 > δ  and   c T , 
ending the game with the utilities  ) 0 , , , , ( ) , , , , ( K K c c N c b a T T U U U U δ δ − − = , or to 
pass the privilege to decide to Playerb . Proceed to stage 5. 
 Stage  5: Player b either approves the application of Player a or disapproves it.  
In the former case, Playera can undertake the project without compensating the other 
players. This ensures that Player a undertakes the project. The resulting utilities in this 
situation are:  ) , , , , ( ) , , , , ( N c b a N c b a V V V V U U U U − − − = K K . In the latter case that 
Player b disapproves Player a’s application, the project is not undertaken and players 
a and b are punished for "bothering" the government official. The fines that players 
aand b pay to the government are equal, respectively, to  δ 2 + c T  and  b T′ (the fine 
levied on Player b depends on her/his earlier declaration in stage 3). The game ends 
with the utilities ) 0 , , 0 , , 2 ( ) , , , , ( K K b c N c b a T T U U U U ′ − − − = δ .  
  Notice that the suggested mechanism does not require any knowledge of the 
cost-bearers about the beneficiary's net reward from the project. Thus, no beliefs 
about the value of this net reward is needed and the concept of Subgame Perfect 
equilibrium is the appropriate one. 
    
Insert Figure 2 here 
Proposition 2: The unique sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of the game satisfies 
the following conditions:  







i a V V , then Player a does not apply for the license.    11 
 
 







i a V V , then Player a applies for the license ,carries out the 
project as well as fully compensates the other players. 







i a V V , then Player a is indifferent between not applying and 
between applying, proceeding, and fully compensating. 
          
         Proof:  Using backward induction, we start by solving for the optimal choice of 
the last mover, Playerb , for each possible situation s/he might face, and then work 
backward to compute the optimal choice for the players acting before, Playerc and 
Playera.  
  Suppose that in stage 1 Player a applies for a license and under reports the 
cost of at least one of the players. Then, as we show in the following, in stage 2, it is 
optimal for Player c to choose one player among of these players, indexed  b . 
Applying the same reasoning as for the case of  1 = N , it follows that Player b 's best 
response is to challenge Player a by declaring  b T′ such that  b b b V T T < ′ < .  Recall that 
by adopting this optimal strategy Player b  induces Player a to give up the project in 
stage 3 and receive a utility  δ − − c T  , which is higher than her/his utility when s/he 
passes the decision to Player b  i.e.,  δ 2 − − c T . The utilities of all players in this case 
will be  ) 0 , , 0 , , , ( ) , , , , ( K K c c N c b a T T U U U U δ δ − − = . If Player c, instead of choosing 
Player b , confirms the announcement of Player a her/his utility will be  c c V T −  which 
is lower than  c T  . Also, if Player b  in stage 3, instead of challenging  Player  a, 
disagrees  with Player c s/he receives  0 < − b b V T which is lower thanδ .  
  Suppose now that in stage 1 Player a applies and announces  i V T i i ∀ ≥  (s/he 
over-reports). In this case it is optimal for Player b (or for any other player that Player 
c will choose) to approve the project already in stage 3 (disagree with Playerc) and 






i a T V
1
. The 
resulting utility of Player b is  b b V T − . This is because if instead of approving Player 
a’s declaration, Player b  challenges Player a by declaring  b T′, such that 
b b b V T T ≥ > ′ . Player a, then, would have passed the privilege to decide to Player b,   12 
 
 
realizing that Player b would approve the license application, in which case her/his 
utility increases from  b T′ −  to  b V −  (the reasoning is the same as in the case of only 
one cost-bearing individual). But,  b V −  is still lower than Player b ’s utility from 
approving Player a’s announcement already in stage 3,  b b V T − . Given that in this 
case, in stage 3, Player b will disagree with Playerc, the utility of Player c will be 
δ − − c c V T . Thus, it is preferable for Player cto agree in stage 2 and benefit from a 
higher utility  c c V T − . To sum up, in the event that Player a announces  i V T i i ∀ ≥ , it 
is optimal for Player c to agree in stage 2, and the resulting utilities will be 





i a N a T V T V T V U U U − − + = ∑
=
=
K K . 
          To sum up, taking into account the optimal behavior of Player b  in stages 3 and 
5, and of Player cin stage 2, Playera can choose one of the following three 
strategies: 
(i) Do not apply for a license to undertake the project. In this case, her/his utility is 
zero, (ii) Apply for a license and under-report the cost of at least one of the players 
indexed b ,  b b V T < .  In this case, in stage 2, Player c will choose Player b  and the 
latter will challenge Player a inducing her/him, in stage 4, not to proceed with the 
project and obtain the utility  δ − − c T . (iii) Apply for a license and make a truthful 
announcement or over-report,  i V T i i ∀ ≥ . In this case, Player c will approve the 
project in stage 2 inducing Player a to undertake the project and compensate all the 
players including her/him according to Playera’s announcement. In this case, Player 






i a T V
1
.  Thus, it is preferable for Playera  to make a truthful report 






i a V V
1
.  It is clear that strategy (i) 
dominates strategy (ii) and therefore, Playera will never chooses strategy (ii). 






















i a V V , then it is optimal 
for Playera to apply for a license, make a truthful cost announcement and undertake   13 
 
 







i a V V , then it is optimal for a not to apply for a 
license. The resulting utilities in these two possible cases are equal, respectively, to 
) 0 , , 0 , ( ) , , , (
1













i a V V  Player a  is indifferent between not applying for a license and 
applying, making a truthful cost announcement and undertaking the project. This is 
because in both cases her/his utility is zero. 
 
5. Conclusion 
    In this paper, we propose a simple sequential mechanism whose subgame- 
perfect Nash equilibrium efficiently and equitably implements a multiple-cost–single-
benefit project under unilateral information. The mechanism can be viewed as being 
complementary to Coase’s solution to the problem of negative externalities since it 
provides a structure for negotiation between the players on the appropriate 
compensation under “unilateral” information in a dichotomous setting.  The structure 
of negotiation is as follows: In the first stage of the five-stage mechanism, if the single 
beneficiary applies for the project, she/he must propose an allocation of compensation 
to all the cost bearers. In the second stage, a randomly selected cost bearer can 
challenge the single beneficiary by stating the name of a cost bearer who is not being 
fully compensated. If that player is indeed being under-compensated, she/he can 
challenge the single beneficiary by proposing an alternative higher compensation for 
her/him. Given this demand for compensation, the single beneficiary can either regret 
and not undertake the project or pass the decision on to the chosen under-compensated 
cost bearer. The mechanism induces the single beneficiary to apply for and undertake 
the project only if her/his net benefit from the project outweighs the cost it imposes on 
the other players. Furthermore, the proposed mechanism also induces the beneficiary 
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